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Shifting Borders and the Boundaries of  Rights: 
Examining the Safe Third Country Agreement 
between Canada and the United States
EFRAT ARBEL*
Abstract
This article analyzes the Canadian Federal Court and Federal Court of  Appeal decisions 
assessing the Safe Third Country Agreement between Canada and the United States (STCA). 
It examines how each court’s treatment of  the location and operation of  the Canada–US 
border influences the results obtained. The article suggests that both in its treatment of  the 
STCA and in its constitutional analysis, the Federal Court decision conceives of  the bor-
der as a moving barrier capable of  shifting outside Canada’s formal territorial boundaries. 
The effect of  this decision is to bring refugee claimants outside state soil within the fold of  
Canadian constitutional protection. In contrast, the Federal Court of  Appeal decision con-
ceives of  the border as both static and shifting. In its treatment of  the STCA, the Court 
conceives of  the border as a moving barrier that shifts outside Canada’s formal territorial 
boundaries to extend state power outwards. Yet, in its constitutional analysis, the Court con-
ceives of  the border as a static barrier that remains fixed at the state’s geographic perimeter 
to limit access to refugee rights. By simultaneously conceiving of  the border in these opposing 
ways, the Court of  Appeal decision places refugee claimants in an impossible legal bind: it 
requires them to present at the (static) border to claim legal protection, but at the same time 
shifts the border in ways that preclude them from doing so. The decision thus suspends refu-
gee claimants between two opposing directives, deprives them of  otherwise actionable rights, 
and denies them recourse to meaningful legal action under Canadian law. The article argues 
that, in this key way, the Federal Court of  Appeal decision does much more than clarify 
the executive discretion of  the Governor-in-Council, as it purports. Rather, it redefines the 
Canadian refugee regime as fundamentally exclusionary towards STCA claimants, and calls 
into question the central principles by which this regime is distinguished and defined.
1. Introduction
In 2004, Canada and the United States entered a bilateral agreement 
known as the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA), which provides 
for the regulation of  refugee claims across the Canada–US border.1 Safe 
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1 National Legislative Bodies, Agreement between the Government of  Canada and the Government 
of  the United States of  America for Cooperation in the Examination of  Refugee Status Claims From 
Nationals of  Third Countries (2004), available at: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/laws-
policy/safe-third.asp> last accessed 15 Sept 2012 (STCA).
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Third Country Agreements, new in North America but common in 
Europe, allow one state party to return refugee claimants back to the other 
(and vice versa) under certain circumstances.2 Enacted to enhance border 
security and promote the orderly handling of  refugee claims across the 
Canada–US border, the STCA prevents refugee claimants who are in the 
United States from lodging claims in Canada (and vice versa), subject to 
certain limited exceptions. Soon after its implementation, the STCA was 
subject to a constitutional challenge before the Federal Court of  Canada. 
In a decision released in November 2007, the Federal Court determined 
that the STCA violated section 15 (equality) and section 7 (life, liberty, and 
security of  person) of  the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms,3 and 
declared it to have no force and effect.4 In June 2008, the Federal Court 
of  Appeal reversed this decision: it found the Charter did not apply and 
restored the STCA’s validity on other grounds.5
This article analyzes these decisions by evaluating how each court’s 
conception about the location and operation of  the border influenced the 
results obtained in each case. It draws attention to two distinct principles at 
play – the ‘static border’ principle and the ‘shifting border’ principle – and 
locates these in each legal judgment.6 It suggests that both in its treatment 
of  the STCA and in its constitutional analysis, the Federal Court decision 
conceives of  the border in shifting terms, and thus partakes of  the logic of  
the ‘shifting border’ principle. The effect of  this is to bring refugee claim-
ants within the fold of  constitutional protection, and entitle them to basic 
rights. In contrast, the Federal Court of  Appeal decision conceives of  the 
border as both static and shifting. In its constitutional analysis, the Court 
determines the border to be a static line that remains fixed at the state’s 
geographic perimeter, and extends constitutional protection only to claim-
ants who cross this line. To this extent, the decision partakes of  the logic 
of  the ‘static border’ principle. However, at the same time, in its treatment 
of  the STCA, the Court conceives of  the border as a shifting barrier that 
disallows refugee claimants from claiming constitutional protection, and 
thus also partakes of  the logic of  the ‘shifting border’ principle.
The article proposes that this approach is both conceptually flawed 
and legally problematic. By simultaneously conceiving of  the border as 
both static and shifting, the Court of  Appeal decision suspends STCA 
2 The STCA is modelled on the Dublin II Regulation of  the European Union. See, Council 
Regulation 343/2003, 2003 OJ (L 50) 1; Commission Regulation 1560/2003, 3003 OJ (L 222) 3.
3 Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms, Part I of  the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule 
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
4 Canadian Council for Refugees v Canada, 2007 FC 1261 (STCA FC).
5 Canada v Canadian Council for Refugees, 2008 FCA 229 (STCA FCA).
6 For a discussion locating both ‘shifting’ and ‘static’ border policies in Canadian and US law, 
including the STCA, see, A Shachar, ‘The Shifting Border of  Immigration Regulation’ (2007) 3 Stan 
J Civil Rights & Civil Liberties 165–93.
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claimants between two contradictory directives, deprives them of  oth-
erwise actionable rights and remedies, and strips them of  recourse to 
meaningful action under Canadian law. The decision thus operates to 
redefine the Canadian refugee protection regime as fundamentally exclu-
sionary towards STCA claimants. In so doing, it calls into question the 
basic principles by which the Canadian refugee regime is distinguished 
and defined.
Before turning to an examination of  the legal judgments, the static and 
shifting border principles should be briefly explained. These principles 
are not established precepts recognized in legal doctrine but, rather, con-
cepts that animate legal discourse. The static border principle, familiar to 
most, imagines the border as a stable perimeter positioned at Canada’s 
geographic boundary line, marking both the state’s territorial edge and 
the bounds of  its legal authority. It is rooted in the traditional Westphalian 
conception of  statehood, and presumes a coherent and mutually enforcing 
correlation between state territory, authority, and rights, with each consti-
tuted as contingent on the other.7 The shifting border principle, in con-
trast, imagines the border as a moving barrier that is legally distinct from 
Canada’s cartographic perimeter, that can be positioned outside Canada’s 
geographic boundary line. These two principles thus stand in stark oppo-
sition to one another: while the static border principle presumes a direct 
correlation between a state’s territory and its legal authority, the shifting 
border principle disaggregates them, and re-locates the locus of  border 
control to places far removed from the territorial boundaries of  the state. 
Both static and shifting border policies are common in Canadian law, and 
are selectively applied to impede or advance different policy goals, be it 
with respect to migration regulation or other transnational or cross-border 
matters. While neither principle is inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’, their simulta-
neous application – as in the Court of  Appeal decision – gives rise to seri-
ous coercive consequences both for refugee rights, and Canada’s refugee 
regime as a whole.
In part two, the article outlines the STCA, detailing its operation and 
effect, to provide context for discussion. In part three, it examines the 
Federal Court and Federal Court of  Appeal’s STCA decisions, focus-
ing primarily on the courts’ respective findings on the application of  the 
Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms. In part four, it concludes by 
evaluating the broader consequences stemming from the Court of  Appeal 
decision and, more broadly, from legal decisions that conceive of  the 
Canadian border in both static and shifting terms.
7 For a discussion of  how these three components – territory, authority, and rights – have changed 
in themselves and in their interrelationships across medieval, national, and global assemblages, see, S 
Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Stanford University Press, 2006).
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2. The STCA: an overview
2.1 Creating a ‘smart’ border
A safe third country clause first appeared in Canadian law in the 1988 
amendments to the Immigration Act of  1976,8 to enable the designation 
of  another country as a ‘safe third country’ for refugees.9 Throughout the 
1990s, Canada and the United States continued to negotiate towards a 
mutual designation, but did not arrive at a final agreement.10 The parties 
resumed negotiations in the aftermath of  the 11 September 2001 attacks 
on the United States, and, within three months, issued the Smart Border 
Declaration. The Declaration sets out the Thirty-Two Point Action Plan 
designed to ‘enhance border security’ and facilitate ‘the legitimate flow 
of  people and goods’ across the Canada–US border.11 The Action Plan 
calls for common standards of  biometric information, anti-terrorism 
measures, and increased visa policy coordination. It also permits exten-
sive sharing of  information on high-risk travellers, and establishes the 
STCA between Canada and the United States.12 On 12 October 2004, 
the Governor-in-Council formally designated the United States as a ‘safe 
third country’ under section 101(1)(e) of  the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act (IRPA).13 The final agreement came into effect on 29 
December 2004.14
In a nutshell, the STCA empowers Canada to summarily turn back 
third country nationals who openly lodge refugee claims at the Canada–US 
8 Immigration Act 1976, SC 1976–77, c 52, cited in STCA FC, above n 4.
9 An Act to amend the Immigration Act, 1976 and the Criminal Code in consequence thereof, SC 
1988, c 36
10 STCA FC, above n 4, at para 8.
11 See, Public Safety Canada, Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan, <http:///www.publicsafety.
gc.ca/prg/le/bs/sbdap-eng.aspx> last accessed 15 Sept 2012.
12 Smart Border Declaration: Building a Smart Border for the 21st Century on the Foundation of  
a North American Zone of  Confidence, 12 Dec 2001, available at: <http://www/dfait-maeci.gc.ca/
anti-terrorism/declaration-en.asp> last accessed 15 Sept 2012.
13 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, RSC 2001, c 207 (IRPA). The IRPA and its associ-
ated regulations prescribe that a country designated as a ‘safe’ country must comply with art 33 of  
the Convention Relating to the Status of  Refugees, Final Act of  the United Nations Conference 
of  Plenipotentiaries on the Status of  Refugees and Stateless Persons, 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 
2545, as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of  Refugees, 189 UNTS 150 
(Refugee Convention) and art 3 of  the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (10 Dec 1984), 1465 UNTS 85, entered into force 26 June 
1987 (Convention Against Torture). Both of  these provisions function as non-refoulement provisions 
and prohibit signatory states from returning a claimant to a country where he or she faces torture or 
other forms of  persecution. In designating a country as ‘safe’, the Governor-in-Council is required 
to also consider its policies and practices with respect to claims under the Refugee Convention and 
its human rights record. The United States is the first and only country designated under s 101(1)(e) 
of  the IRPA.
14 Citizenship and Immigration Canada, ‘News Release – Safe Third Country Agreement comes 
into force today’, 29 Dec 2004, available at: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/
releases/2004/0420-pre.asp> last accessed 15 Sept 2012.
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border, unless they fall within certain limited exceptions.15 Put simply, the 
STCA prohibits refugee claimants who first set foot in the United States 
from lodging refugee claims in Canada, and vice versa. The STCA binds 
both Canada and the United States to ‘take back’ claimants who attempt 
to enter in violation of  the agreement, and to assume responsibility for 
adjudicating their claims. The agreement allows for some exceptions that 
accord with the governing ideologies of  the Canadian refugee regime – 
cases of  family unification, child and minor applicants, and claimants fac-
ing the death penalty – but it is otherwise applicable to all refugee claimants 
who lodge claims at the land border.16 Notably, the STCA does not apply 
to claimants who arrive other than by land, or who lodge ‘inland’ claims 
from within Canadian territory.17
The premise of  the STCA is that since both Canada and the United 
States recognize each other as ‘safe’ countries for refugees, wherein refugee 
15 Art 4(1), which lies at the heart of  the STCA, provides that ‘the Party of  the country of  last 
presence shall examine, in accordance with its refugee status determination system, the refugee status 
claim of  any person who arrives at a land border port of  entry on or after the effective date of  this 
Agreement and makes a refugee status claim’. STCA, above n 1.
16 There are four broad exceptions to the STCA: the family member exception, the unaccompa-
nied minors exception, the document holder exception, and public interest exception. See, CBSA, 
‘Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement – Exceptions to the Agreement’, available at: <http://
www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/stca-etps-eng.html#exception> last accessed 15 Sept 2012. The 
exceptions are listed in section 159.5 of  the Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Regulations (IRPR), SOR/2004–217, 12 Oct 2004  <http://www.canadagazette.gc.ca/
archives/p2/2004/2004-11-03/html/sor-dors217-eng.html> last accessed 15 Sept 2012. It is worth 
noting that a recent study conducted by the Canadian Council for Refugees (CCR) and Sojourn 
House casts doubt on whether the family reunification exceptions is consistently applied. The Report 
notes that ‘[p]ractitioners who work with refugee claimants on both sides of  the Canada-U.S. border 
described what they perceive as a lack of  uniform procedure in assessing family relationships’ (at 24). 
The report further states that ‘experienced practitioners observed that claimants from certain countries 
appear, at times, to encounter stricter standards of  evidence than others. For example, some officers 
appear to be unfairly sceptical about documents from certain countries, without being adequately 
sensitive to the challenges of  obtaining documents from these same countries’. The Report concludes 
that ‘unreasonable and inconsistent assessment of  family relationships have in some cases undermined 
the fair application of  the family member exception’ (at 25). See, CCR and Sojourn House, ‘Welcome 
to Canada: the Experience of  Refugee Claimants at Port-of-Entry Interviews’ (Nov 2010), available at: 
<http://www.ccrweb.ca/files/poereport.pdf> last accessed 15 Sept 2012.
17 CBSA, ‘Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement – Where the Agreement is in Effect’, 
<http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/stca-etps-eng.html#where> last accessed 15 Sept 2012. 
See also, the decision of  the Federal Court, STCA FC, above n 4, at para 29, which explains as fol-
lows: ‘A feature of  the STCA regime is that, in accordance with the Regulations, it only operates at 
land ports of  entry. The STCA regime does not apply to travellers arriving in Canada by air or water 
from the U.S.’. As Macklin further explains: ‘One of  the reasons the present Agreement does not 
apply to inland refugee claims is the impossibility of  determining whether inland claimants arrived via 
the United States. Refugee claimants who wish to pursue their claim in Canada have no incentive to 
disclose that they passed through the United States and every reason to conceal that fact. The task of  
establishing a person’s route into Canada or the United States is obviated when the person concerned 
is literally standing at the Canada-U.S. border’, in A Macklin, ‘Disappearing Refugees: Reflections on 
the Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement’ (2004–2005) 36 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 365–426, at 
373. For a discussion of  the ‘geographic hypocrisies’ of  this requirement, see A Mountz, Seeking Asylum: 
Human Smuggling and Bureaucracy at the Border (University of  Minnesota Press, 2010), at 50.
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claimants are afforded full consideration of  their claims, the restrictions 
it imposes do not place claimants at risk. The ‘safe’ designation attests 
to each country’s formal compliance with the Refugee Convention18 and 
the Convention Against Torture,19 and their general human rights record. 
The STCA explicitly affirms both Canada’s and the United States’ inter-
national legal obligation to protect refugees who are present on their ter-
ritory, and expresses the parties’ desire to ‘promote and protect human 
rights and fundamental freedoms’, including those set out in the Refugee 
Convention and the Convention Against Torture.20 It also imposes formal 
safeguards to ensure that claimants are not removed to any country other 
than Canada or the United States until their claim is heard. These safe-
guards are ostensibly designed to prevent what is known as chain refoule-
ment, or the deflection of  a refugee claimant from one country to another 
until their eventual return to their country of  origin to conditions of  perse-
cution.21 The STCA’s primary goal, as stated in its preamble, is to enhance 
‘the international protection of  refugees’ by promoting ‘the orderly han-
dling of  asylum applications’ and ‘the principle of  burden sharing’.22
The motivations for implementing the STCA varied between Canada 
and the United States. Critics generally agree that the United States imple-
mented the STCA to enhance border security and counter-terrorism mea-
sures in response to the 11 September 2001 attacks. In contrast, Canada was 
motivated less by a concern for enhancing border security, and more by a 
desire to reduce the number of  refugee claimants eligible to enter Canada. 
In a report dated July 2010, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) 
confirms that ‘[w]hile the primary focus for the United States was security, 
Canada sought to limit the significant irregular northbound movement of  
people from the United States who wished to access the Canadian refugee 
determination system’.23 Statistics indicate that the movement of  people 
across the border was indeed uneven prior to the STCA’s implementation. 
18 Refugee Convention, above n 13.
19 Convention against Torture, above n 13.
20 STCA, above n 1, preamble.
21 ibid, at art 3(1)–(3) and preamble.
22 ibid, preamble.
23 CBSA, ‘United States-Canada: Joint Border Threat and Risk Assessment’ (July 2010), available 
at: <http:www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/security-securite/pip-pep/jbtra-ecmrf-eng.pdf> last accessed 15 Sept 
2012, at 12. See also, Macklin, above n 17. That the goal of  reducing numbers is forefront on the 
legislature’s mind is further suggested by the amendments to section 159.6 IRPR introduced in 2009, 
designed to plug a hole in the STCA by removing one of  its exceptions. Prior to June 2009, nationals of  
countries to which Canada had imposed a temporary suspension of  removals, or ‘moratorium coun-
tries’, were also exempted from the safe third country rule. The amendment removed this exemption, 
and was intended to ‘protect the integrity of  the refugee status determination system by ensuring that 
refugee protection claimants who have had the opportunity to have their claims assessed in the United 
States are not making claims in Canada, and will reduce pressures on, and costs to, the refugee pro-
tection system’. See, ‘Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations’ Canada Gazette 
(vol 143, no 16, 5 Aug 2009), available at: <http://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2009/2009-08-05/html/
sor-dors210-eng.html> last accessed 15 Sept 2012.
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According to Citizenship and Immigration Canada, between 8,000 and 
13,000 refugee claimants entered Canada through the United States annu-
ally between 1995 and 2001.24 These figures make sense given Canada’s 
geographic location: unless a claimant can secure arrival by air or water 
– a prospect that remains beyond the reach of  many – the primary point 
of  entry is by crossing the Canada–US border. During this same period, 
in contrast, only 200 refugee claimants entered the United States from 
Canada each year.25
2.2 The effects of  implementation
Since its implementation, the STCA has proven effective in reducing refu-
gee eligibility to enter Canada. Because the STCA does not prescribe a 
mechanism for meaningful monitoring, little reliable information is avail-
able about its effects.26 According to statistics obtained from the CBSA, sev-
eral hundred refugee claimants have been rejected under the STCA each 
year since its implementation. The numbers varied by year, ranging from 
301 in 2005, rising to a high of  768 in 2009, and declining to 591 in 2011.27
These figures, however, only tell part of  the story. Since the STCA not 
only turns claimants away at the border, but also discourages claimants 
from presenting at the border, its effects are more significant than these 
numbers reveal. Additional statistics obtained from the CBSA show that, 
prior to the STCA’s implementation, between 8,000 and 14,000 refugee 
claims were lodged at the Canada–US border each year.28 In the first 
24 See, Macklin, above n 17, at 394–5, citing ‘Report of  the Standing Committee on Citizenship 
and Immigration’, Joe Fontana MP (Chair), House of  Commons (Dec 2002), available at: <http://
www.parl.gc.ca/CommitteeBusiness/CommitteeHome.aspx?Cmte=CIMM&Language=E&Mode=
1&Parl=41&Ses=2> last accessed 15 Sept 2012.
25 Macklin, ibid. Notably, the United States has registered a steady increase in asylum applica-
tions since the implementation of  the STCA. According to the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), in 2010, the United States registered 13% more asylum applications than it did in 
2009, amounting to approximately 55,500 new applications, compared to 49,000 in 2009. See, IOM 
Regional and Country Figures, available at: <http://www.iom.int>, cited in Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, 
‘Responses to Secondary Movements of  Refugees: A Comparative Preliminary Study of  State Practice 
in South Africa, Spain, and the USA’ (Aug 2011), UNHCR website <www.unhcr.org/4ef3321b9.pdf> 
last accessed 15 Sept 2012. While these statistics reflect a range of  factors, it is likely that by closing off 
the Canadian border to land bound refugee claimants travelling through the United States, the STCA 
at least partially contributed to the overall rise in asylum applications lodged in the United States.
26 The STCA’s mandated monitoring is narrowly focused on whether the STCA is being correctly 
applied, not on how the STCA, when correctly applied, impacts refugee claimants. See STCA, above 
n 1, art 8.
27 The precise figures are as follows. 2005: 301 claimants rejected, 299 at the border, 1 at the air-
port, and 1 inland. 2006: 402 claimants rejected, all at the border. 2007: 500 claimants rejected, all 
at the border. 2008: 640 claimants rejected, all at the border. 2009: 768 claimants rejected, 763 at the 
border, 2 at the airport and 3 inland. 2010: 761 claimants rejected, all at the border. 2011: 591 claim-
ants rejected, 537 at the border and 54 inland. Statistics provided by the CBSA upon request, dated 
8 May 2012.
28 The precise figures for refugee claims lodged at the border are as follows. 2001: 14,009; 2002: 
10,856; 2003: 10,938; 2004: 8,904. Statistics provided by the CBSA upon request, dated 8 May 2012.
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year of  the STCA’s operation, the number of  claims lodged at the bor-
der declined by over 50 per cent, from 8,904 in 2004 to 4,041 in 2005.29 
Recent statistics suggest a continuation of  this trend. In 2010, for example, 
4,642 claims were lodged at the border. In 2011, the numbers dropped 
significantly, with only 2,563 claims.30 In 2012, 3,790 claims were lodged 
at the border.31
Because the STCA applies only at land ports of  entry, and does not 
apply to people who advance ‘inland’ claims, critics argue that it not only 
creates incentives for human smuggling, but has also prompted a rise in 
unauthorized border crossings into Canada.32 Due to the clandestine 
nature of  unauthorized border crossings, it is difficult to track these num-
bers with any certainty. A 2010 Evaluation Study of  the CBSA Detentions 
and Removals Program suggests the STCA has inadvertently increased 
numbers of  unauthorized entries into Canada between ports of  entry by 
migrants who wish to avoid being turned back at the border.33 In this key 
29 Information provided by the CBSA upon request. The CCR reports that, in total, less 
than 20,000 claims were made in Canada in 2005, fewer than at any point since the 1980s. See, 
CCR, ‘Closing the Front Door on Refugees: Report on the First Year of  the Safe Third Country 
Agreement’ (2005), available at: <http://www.ccrweb.ca/closingdoordec05.pdf> last accessed 15 
Sept 2012, at 3.
30 CBSA, above n 27. The precise figures for refugee claims lodged at the border are as follows. 
2005: 4,041; 2006: 4,478; 2007: 8,191; 2008: 10,803; 2009: 6,295; 2010: 4,642; 2011: 2,563. The 
higher numbers reported in 2007–09 is attributable largely to the ‘moratorium countries’exception, in 
effect until June 2009 when it was repealed, see above n 23. These figures are noted in a recent CBSA 
Evaluation Study of  the Detention and Removals Program, which suggests that while the STCA ‘ini-
tially reduced the number of  land border refugee claimants, such claims more than doubled between 
2005 and 2008 (from 4,042 to 10,801) – essentially increasing the number of  refugee claimants to pre-
Safe Third Country Agreement levels’. See, Final Report (Nov 2010), available at: <http://cbsa-asfc.
gc.ca/agency-agence/reports-rapports/ae-ve/2010/dr-rd-eng.html> last accessed 15 Sept 2012. This 
Report, however, fails to account for the fact that the numbers decreased significantly (approx. 4,000 
claims per year) after the exception’s repeal. It is also worth noting that the STCA’s impact on specific 
groups of  refugee claimants has been especially severe, particularly those who have difficulties access-
ing the US system. Eg, in 2004, prior to the STCA’s implementation, Colombia was the top country of  
origin for claims made in Canada, with an 80% acceptance rate. In the first year after the STCA came 
into effect, the admission rate for Colombian claimants – many of  whom are barred from asylum in 
the United States due to the ‘material support for terrorism’ bar – dropped to less than a third of  the 
2004 numbers, see, CCR Report, ibid. More recently, Mexican claimants felt the impact of  the STCA, 
given the imposition of  visa requirements on Mexican nationals in 2009, but little data is available as 
to precisely how and to what extent.
31 Statistics provided by the CBSA upon request, dated 4 Jan 2013.
32 See, eg, Harvard Immigration and Refugee Law Clinic, ‘Bordering on Failure: The U.S.-Canada 
Safe Third Country Agreement Fifteen Months after Implementation’, March 2006 (Harvard STCA 
Report), available at: <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/clinic/documents/Harvard_
STCA_Report.pdf> last accessed 15 Sept 2012, at 21–2. It concludes that the STCA is making the 
border less secure, endangers the lives of  refugee claimants, and prompts an increase in unauthorized 
entries into Canada. See also, Mountz, above n 17, for a discussion of  the STCA’s impact on human 
smuggling.
33 CBSA Final Report, Nov 2010, above n 30. This situation is not unlike that created by Canada’s 
carrier sanctions, which make it increasingly difficult for refugee claimants to enter the country law-
fully, but do not preclude them from lodging claims if  they enter through unlawful means.
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respect, critics argue that the STCA has failed to meet its stated objective 
of  making the border more secure.34
2.3 Shifting away from Canadian standards
Critics generally agree that the United States provides a significantly 
diminished level of  protection to refugees.35 This was one of  the key find-
ings made by the Federal Court in its STCA decision: the Court found 
that the United States was in material breach of  its international refugee 
protection obligations such that it was unreasonable for the Governor-in-
Council to conclude that the United States is a ‘safe’ country for refugees.36 
Perhaps most significantly, US law imposes a series of  procedural bars that 
categorically exclude broad classes of  refugee claimants on a non-review-
able basis and without individual consideration or balancing, in ways that 
directly contravene Canadian standards. While a comprehensive analysis 
of  these measures is beyond the scope of  this article, a brief  overview pro-
vides important context for understanding the effects of  the STCA.
The US Immigration and Nationality Act imposes a one-year filing 
deadline, known as the one-year bar, which prohibits claimants who do 
not file a claim within one year of  arrival from seeking asylum, subject to 
limited discretionary exceptions.37 Ignorance of  the one-year filing dead-
line is not considered a valid reason for failure to file a timely applica-
tion.38 Critics have argued that the one-year bar violates international law 
34 Above n 32.
35 For analysis, see Harvard STCA Report, above n 32. See also Macklin, above n 17, for discussion.
36 STCA FC, above n 4, at para 240: ‘These instances of  non-compliance with art 33 are sufficiently 
serious and fundamental to refugee protection that it was unreasonable for the GIC to conclude that 
the U.S. is a “safe country”‘. Notably, the Federal Court of  Appeal did not specifically overturn these 
findings. See, STCA FCA, above n 5.
37 See, 8 USC s 1158(a)(2)(B). The one-year filing deadline allows for exceptions in certain cases 
involving changed circumstances, serious illness or disability, legal disability or ineffective assistance 
of  counsel: 8 CFR s 208.4(a). For further details see, US Department of  Homeland Security, Asylum 
Officers Basic Training Course: One-Year Filing Deadline, 10–12, 23–4, 26–8, 30–1 (2009), available 
at: <http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/One-Year-Filing-Deadline.pdf> last accessed 15 Sept 2012. 
For a discussion of  the application of  the one-year bar in US case law, see, eg, Matter of  T-M-H- & S-W-
C-, 25 I&N Dec 193 (BIA 2010) (holding that an alien does not receive an automatic one-year exten-
sion in which to file an asylum application following ‘changed circumstances’ under section 208(a)(2)
(D) of  the INA, 8 USC s 1158(a)(2)(D) (2006)); Minasayan v Mukasey, 553 F3d 1224 (9th Cir 2009) (hold-
ing that the one-year time period includes the date of  entry); Khunaverdiants v Mukasey, 548 F3d 760 (9th 
Cir 2008) (holding that proof  of  an exact date of  entry is not required when there is other supporting 
evidence showing that the asylum application was filed less than one year after arrival); Matter of  F-P-
R-, 24 I&N Dec 681 (BIA 2008) (holding that for purposes of  determining if  an alien’s application for 
asylum was timely filed within one year of  arrival in the United States, the term ‘last arrival’ in 8 CFR, 
s 1208.4(a)(2)(ii) (2008) refers to the alien’s most recent arrival in the United States from a trip abroad); 
Matter of  C-W-L-, 24 I&N Dec 346 (BIA 2007) (holding that an alien who is subject to a final order of  
removal is barred by both statute and regulation from filing an untimely motion to reopen removal 
proceedings to submit a successive asylum application under section 208(a)(2)(D) of  the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, 8 USC s 1158(a)(2)(D) (2000), based on changed personal circumstances).
38 See, US Department of  Homeland Security, Asylum Officers Basic Training Course, ibid.
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and leads to arbitrary denials of  refugee protection.39 There is no such 
equivalent prohibition in Canadian law, in keeping with international 
standards providing that asylum requests should not be denied based on 
failure to fulfill formal requirements.40 US law further bars from asylum 
any claimant who has provided ‘material support’ to terrorist organiza-
tions or activities,41 and does not strictly require proof  that an individual 
did so knowingly.42 These policies have been heavily criticized,43 and stray 
from the Canadian practice of  requiring demonstrated proof  of  individual 
responsibility for any criminal or terrorist activity, and allowing for excep-
tions in cases of  duress.44 The US regime also bars claimants convicted 
of  ‘aggravated felonies’, and classifies as ‘aggravated’ a range of  offences 
that would not be considered particularly serious under Canadian law.45 In 
contrast, Canadian law only formally bars claimants who are inadmissible 
39 See, eg, Human Rights First, ‘The Asylum Filing Deadline: Denying Protection to the Persecuted 
and Undermining Governmental Efficiency’ (2010), available at: <http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
pdf/afd.pdf>. See also, Karen Musalo and Marcelle Rice, ‘The Implementation of  the One-Year 
Bar to Asylum’ (2008) 31 Hastings Int’l & Comp L Rev 693; Philip Schrag, et al, ‘Rejecting Refugees: 
Homeland Security’s Administration of  the One-Year Bar to Asylum’ (Dec 2010)  52 William and 
Mary L Rev 651.
40 See, ‘UNHCR Comments on Proposed Rules on “Inspection and Expedited Removal of  Aliens; 
Detention and Removal of  Aliens: Conduct of  Removal Proceedings; and Asylum Procedures”‘ (4 Feb 
1997). UNHCR’s Executive Committee has stated that, ‘[w]hile asylum-seekers may be required to 
submit their asylum request within a certain time limit, failure to do so, or the non-fulfilment of  other 
formal requirements, should not lead to an asylum request being excluded from consideration’. See, 
UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No 15, 1979. This also contravenes Canadian standards 
that reject delay as a decisive factor in the adjudication of  asylum claims, per Huerta v MEI, [1993] FCJ 
no 271 (CA) and Hue v MEI, [1988] FCJ no 283 (CA).
41 See, 8 USC, s 1182(a)(3)(B) (2005). The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act implements a very expansive 
definition of  ‘material support’ to include ‘transfer[ing] of  funds, or other material financial benefit’, 
and applies a broad definition of  the term ‘terrorist activities’, to encompass the use of  ‘any weapon 
or dangerous device’ other than for ‘mere personal gain’. See, Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of  
2001, PubL no 107–56, s 411, 115 Stat 272 (codified at 8 USC s 1182(a)(3)(B)).
42 The PATRIOT Act’s ‘reasonably should know’ language appears to establish an objective stan-
dard that requires no actual knowledge, ibid. The case law further provides that individuals who are 
extorted by terrorist organizations, even under duress, captivity, or threat of  violence, will be barred 
from asylum. See, eg, Amaya Arias v Ashcroft, 143 Fed Appx 464 (2 Aug 2005); Ramirez v Canada (MEI) 
(1992), 2 FC 306 (CA); Moreno v Canada (MEI), [1994] 1 FC 298 (CA); Sivakumar v Canada (MCI) (1994), 
1 FC 433.
43 See, eg, Human Rights First, ‘Denial and Delay: The Impact of  the Immigration Law’s 
“Terrorism Bars” on Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the United States’ (2009), available at: <http://
www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/RPP-DenialandDelay-FULL-111009-web.pdf> 
last accessed 15 Sept 2012.
44 In the case of  duress, Canada v Asghedom [2001] FCT 972 confirms the Immigration and Refugee 
Board’s holding that the claimant was not barred from refugee status, despite his complicity in crimes 
against humanity, because he had acted under duress. Further, Canadian law allows refoulement of  a 
refugee only if  ‘reasonable grounds’ exist for regarding him as a danger to national security, or if  he has 
been convicted of  a serious crime and constitutes a danger to the community. See, eg, Suresh v Canada 
(Minister of  Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 SCR 3.
45 See, INA s 101(a)(43), 8 USC s 1101(a)(43) (2005) (defining ‘aggravated felony’); INA s 208(b)(2)
(B)(i), 8 USC s 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (2005) (providing that individuals convicted of  aggravated felonies will 
be considered to have been convicted of  a particularly serious crime).
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on grounds of  security, violating human or international rights, and seri-
ous or organized criminality.46
In each of  these scenarios, since Canadian law does not impose such 
prohibitions, it is likely that a refugee claimant barred from asylum in the 
United States would, at the very least, be entitled to a refugee determina-
tion hearing in Canada. By operation of  the STCA, however, these claim-
ants are sent back to the United States (unless they satisfy one of  the STCA’s 
exceptions) where they are often detained, and in some circumstances sub-
ject to removal orders or returned to their home states to face persecution. 
As a result, and despite assurances to the contrary in its preamble, the 
STCA risks refouling refugee claimants before they have their claims heard 
on their merits. In this respect, as Macklin argues, the STCA effectively 
‘allows Canada to do indirectly what it cannot do directly, namely, deny 
refugees the rights to which they are entitled according to international 
and domestic law’.47
2.4 Shifting the location of  border enforcement
The STCA not only restricts refugee eligibility to enter Canada and turns 
claimants away at the border. No less significantly, the STCA also alters 
both the location and operation of  the Canadian border. The STCA imag-
ines a new kind of  border – a ‘smart’ border – that shifts the site of  border 
enforcement away from Canada’s cartographic perimeter with respect to 
land bound refugee claimants.
The notion that state borders are shifting is increasingly gaining accep-
tance in the scholarly literature. The movement towards shifting borders is 
a global one: as globalization continues to destabilize the traditional align-
ment between territory, authority, and rights, states are developing policies 
that redraw state boundaries to facilitate heightened migration regulation 
and enhanced border control.48 National borders have, in Balibar’s words, 
changed places: ‘[w]hereas traditionally, and in conformity with both their 
judicial definition and “cartographical” representation as incorporated 
into national memory, they should be at the edge of  the territory, marking the 
point where it ends, it seems that borders and the institutional practices 
46 See, IRPA s 101(1), and Refugee Convention arts 1(F)(a), 1(F)(b), 1(F)(c), and 1(E), above n 13. In 
further contrast with Canadian law, US law does not require a balancing between the danger posed 
by the claimant’s criminal acts and the harm that claimant would likely face if  returned to a place 
of  persecution. See, eg, In re A---H--, 23 I & N Dec 774 (AG 2005), which provides that the Attorney 
General requires only potential belief  that a person may pose a danger.
47 Macklin, above n 17, at 380. Macklin argues that this process also gives rise to the ‘discursive 
disappearance’ of  refugee claimants, and prompts an increase in unauthorized migration, at 365.
48 This pattern has been well canvassed in the scholarly literature. As Bosniak notes, the ‘growing 
(though uneven) permeability of  national borders, often described under the rubric of  “globalization” 
has become axiomatic in much social and economic scholarship’, in L Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien: 
Dilemmas of  Contemporary Membership (Princeton University Press, 2006), 8–9. For further discussion, 
see also, S Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of  Globalization (Columbia University Press, 1996).
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corresponding to them have been transported into the middle of  political 
space’.49 Shachar’s description is apt:
A novice to the field of  immigration might expect the legal boundaries of  inclu-
sion and exclusion to correlate with the ‘cartographic’ borders of  US territory. 
The reality, however, is far more complicated. The firm borderlines drawn in 
the world atlas do not necessarily coincide with those adhered to, indeed cre-
ated through, immigration law and policy. Instead, we increasingly witness a 
border that is in flux: at once more open and more closed than in the past. 
More important still for the purpose of  our discussion, the location of  the bor-
der is shifting – at times penetrating into the interior, in other circumstances 
extending beyond the edge of  territory. And in other contexts, these borders 
are reappearing, even more robustly, as a physically refortified barrier, offering 
a sharp demarcation line between the US and its neighbors to the South and 
the North.50
Differing in form and application, shifting border measures imagine 
national borders as moving barriers that are conceptually, legally, and geo-
graphically removed from the cartographic perimeter of  the state. These 
measures allow states to assert greater control over the legal and political 
rules governing the treatment of  outsiders. As Shachar further explains: 
‘This redesign has been accomplished by enforcing the sovereign preroga-
tive to deny or permit access in a whole new way: by redrawing (indeed, 
redefining) the once fixed and static territorial border, transforming it 
into something more malleable and movable, which can be placed and 
replaced – by the words of  law – in whatever location that best suits the 
goals of  restricting access’.51 By shifting the location of  border enforce-
ment, states maintain authority over migration in an age of  increased 
human movements. Selectively utilized, such measures allow states to 
‘regain control over their crucial realm of  responsibility, to determine who 
to permit to enter, who to remove, and who to keep at bay’.52
While not unique among states in its implementation of  shifting border 
measures, Canada is certainly among the most effective. The Canadian 
government has been implementing interdiction abroad measures for 
decades, and has been labelled ‘something of  a pioneer in instruments 
49 E Balibar, We The People of  Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship (Princeton University Press, 
2004), 109 (emphasis in original).
50 Shachar, above n 6, at 166.
51 Shachar, above n 6, at 167. This practice is becoming increasingly commonplace as a migra-
tion strategy tool. As the IOM noted in a recent report, ‘[m]any states which have the ability to do 
so find that intercepting migrants before they reach their territories is one of  the most effective mea-
sures to enforce their domestic immigration laws and policies’. See, Human Rights Watch et al, NGO 
Background Paper on the Refugee and Migration Interface (2001), available at: <http://www.hrw.
org/reports/2001/06/28/ngo-background-paper-refugee-and-migration-interface> at 10, cited in 
Shachar, above n 6, at 176.
52 Shachar, above n 6, at 167.
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of  interdiction’.53 These measures subject refugee claimants to determina-
tions that would otherwise happen at Canadian ports of  entry in places far 
removed from Canada’s territorial boundaries. They also allow Canada 
to avoid triggering the constitutional protections that extend to refugee 
claimants who are physically present on state soil.54
The Canadian government began implementing interdiction mea-
sures in the 1980s, but increased their use and scope significantly since 
the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. Since 2001, Canada 
has increased interdiction abroad by posting more Immigration Control 
Officers, Migration Integrity Specialists, and Airline Liaison Officers in 
overseas locations to prevent asylum seekers from reaching Canada.55 
Officers who are posted overseas also provide information about irregu-
lar migrants to Canadian authorities and assist in training airline per-
sonnel to detect false documents and suspicious persons. In so doing, 
as Mountz explains, they ‘act informally as liaisons between foreign 
embassies, private security companies at airports, airlines, and host 
authorities … [to] prevent people from reaching sovereign territories 
to make refugee claims’.56 The posting of  migration officers in offshore 
locations works in tandem with sanctions that penalize airlines who 
transport irregular migrants on Canada-bound flights by demanding 
reimbursement for costs associated with detention, return, and, in some 
53 Macklin, above n 17, at 378–9. In a report dated 1998, Canada’s Senate Standing Committee on 
Citizenship and Immigration concluded that ‘the interdiction abroad of  people who are inadmissible 
to Canada is the most efficient manner of  reducing the need for costly, lengthy removal process’, and 
increased the implementation of  interdiction abroad measures shortly thereafter. See, Senate Report 
of  the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration Detention and Removal, 
recommendation 18 (1998), cited in Shachar, above n 6, at 184. In addition to these offshore measures, 
the Canadian government also used to authorize the application of  ‘direct back’ procedures in which 
a foreign national arriving into Canada from the United States can be temporarily returned to the 
United States without assurances as to their capacity for return. Since the ‘direct back’ policy is applied 
at the cartographic border, it does not explicitly rely on the ‘shifting border’ principle, but nonetheless 
limits the ability of  refugee claimants to enter the state. In response to significant criticism of  this policy 
by UNHCR (see, ‘Monitoring Report: Canada-United States “Safe Third Country” Agreement: 29 
December 2004 – 28 December 2005’ (June 2006), at 25) CBSA issued a new policy guideline stating 
that, effective from 1 Sept 2006, the use of  direct backs ‘will be limited to exceptional circumstances 
and will be subject to monitoring by National Headquarters’ (see, CBSA, ‘Memorandum for Regional 
Directors General: Land Border Services Officers: Subject: Direct Back Procedures for Refugee 
Claimants at the Land Border’, 11 July 2006, at 1), though reports conducted by advocacy groups 
suggest the direct back policy was used long after that date. Notably, the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights recently held that Canada’s ‘direct-back’ policy violates its international human 
rights obligations. The decision is available on the CCR website, at <http://ccrweb.ca/files/iachrdeci-
sion_johndoe.pdf> last accessed 15 Sept 2012.
54 As the Supreme Court of  Canada explained in Singh v Canada (Minister of  Employment and 
Immigration), [1985] 1 SCR 177, ‘every human being who is physically present in Canada and by virtue of  
such presence amenable to Canadian law’ – including refugee claimants – has the right to have their 
claims heard on their merits in accordance with the principles of  fundamental justice (at para 35).
55 Mountz, above n 17, at 137. See also, CCR, Interdicting Refugees (May 1998), 29, available at: 
<http://ccrweb.ca/files/interd.pdf> last accessed 15 Sept 2012.
56 Mountz, ibid.
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cases, expenses for medical care.57 The combined use of  these measures 
both presumes and enables a significant change in the perception and 
operation of  the border.58
While the STCA is not commonly regarded as an interdiction mea-
sure, it nonetheless partakes of  the logic of  the shifting border principle. 
Notwithstanding that the STCA is formally applied at the geographic bor-
der, it determines a refugee’s eligibility to enter Canada when first setting 
foot on US soil, long before approaching the Canadian border. The fact 
that a refugee claimant first entered the United States fixes and, indeed, 
nullifies the ability to lodge a refugee claim at the Canadian border (unless 
the claimant fits the agreement’s narrow exceptions). In effect, therefore, 
the STCA establishes a moving, fictional boundary around the refugee 
claimant in question: it imagines the US border as travelling with the refu-
gee into Canada, in ways that preclude the claimant from (legally) enter-
ing the state to claim protection. In this way the STCA transforms what 
was once dubbed the world’s longest undefended border into a fortified 
barrier, making it virtually impossible for land-bound claimants who do 
not satisfy one of  the STCA’s exceptions to enter Canada, unless doing 
so clandestinely.59 In shifting the location of  border assessment, the STCA 
thus also shifts the operation of  the border, from a point of  substantive con-
sideration, to one of  procedural refusal. The STCA shifts the focus of  the 
refugee analysis from the ‘why’ to the ‘where’: it determines refugee eligi-
bility based on the location from which the claim is made, rather than on 
its substantive merit.
3. Challenging the STCA
3.1 The Federal Court decision
On the first anniversary of  the STCA’s entry into force, the Canadian 
Council for Refugees, Amnesty International, and the Canadian Council 
of  Churches challenged its validity before the Federal Court of  Canada. 
57 Shachar, above n 6 at 185, citing A Brouwer and J Kumin, ‘Interception and Asylum: When 
Migration Control and Human Rights Collide’ (2003) 21 Refuge 6–24, at 10. As Mountz further 
explains, these measures also point to the growing privatization of  border enforcement: ‘not only 
are private companies, such as airlines and transport industries being paid by states to build and run 
detention centers and police borders, but they are also forced to pay states when then fail’, above n 
17 at 137.
58 For a comparative account, see, Shachar’s discussion of  the US-VISIT program, above n 6, 
at 176.
59 For a discussion of  the fortification of  North America, see, eg, E Gilbert, ‘Leaky Borders and 
Solid Citizens: Governing Security, Prosperity and Quality of  Life in a North American Partnership’ 
(2007) 39 Antipode 77. See also, D Bhandar, ‘Renormalizing Citizenship and Life in Fortress North 
America’ (2004) 8 Citizenship Studies 261; M Sparke, ‘Passports into Credit Cards: On the Borders 
and Spaces of  Neoliberal Citizenship’ in JD Migdal (ed), Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the 
Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices (CUP, 2004).
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The named claimant in the case, identified as John Doe, was an asylum 
seeker from Colombia who sought refugee status in the United States, 
he was denied as a result of  the one-year bar discussed above. John Doe 
wished to apply for refugee status in Canada, but was precluded from 
doing so as a result of  the STCA.60 The applicants sought a declaration 
that the designation of  the United States as a ‘safe third country’ and the 
resulting ineligibility triggered by the STCA were invalid and unlawful. 
This argument hinged on the claim that the United States failed to respect 
its obligations under the Refugee Convention and the Convention against 
Torture, and thus could not be considered a ‘safe’ country for refugees. 
The applicants argued that, as a result, Canada’s policy of  turning refugee 
claimants back to the United States under the STCA amounted to indirect 
refoulement. They further argued that the STCA and its associated regula-
tions violated section 15 (equality) and section 7 (life, liberty, and security 
of  person) of  the Canadian Charter of  Rights and Freedoms and should 
be struck down.61
In a decision issued in November 2007, Justice Phelan of  the Federal 
Court of  Canada found the STCA was invalid and declared it of  no force 
and effect. Justice Phelan found that the United States could not be des-
ignated a ‘safe’ country for refugees pursuant to section 102 of  the IRPA, 
given its failure to comply with the non-refoulement provisions in art 33 of  
the Refugee Convention and art 3 of  the Convention Against Torture.62 
Justice Phelan held that compliance with these provisions was a condition 
precedent to the Governor-in-Council’s exercise of  its delegated authority 
under section 102 of  the IRPA. He further found that the Governor-in-
Council acted unreasonably in concluding that the United States complied 
with these provisions, and in failing to ensure a continuing review of  US 
practices and policies as required by the IRPA. Finally, Justice Phelan held 
that the STCA violated both sections 15 and 7 of  the Charter, in ways that 
could not be ‘demonstrably justified’ under the Charter’s section 1 analy-
sis.63 As a result, he declared the STCA and the implementing provisions 
of  the Regulations ultra vires.
60 Notably, as part of  the proceedings, the applicants sought an injunction to prevent Canadian 
authorities from invoking the STCA in the event that John Doe presented himself  at a Canadian 
border post. An interim injunction was granted. Ultimately, against the background of  this litigation, 
the US authorities agreed to have John Doe’s refugee claim reconsidered, and eventually granted him 
refugee status. See, STCA FC decision, above n 4, at para 113.
61 Charter of  Rights and Freedoms, above n 3.
62 STCA FC decision, above n 4.
63 Section 1 of  the Charter, often referred to as its limiting provision, guarantees the rights and free-
doms set out in the Charter ‘only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society’, above n 3. In order to demonstrate a Charter violation, a 
claimant must not only prove that his/her rights were violated under, eg, section 7 or 15 of  the Charter, 
but also, that this violation cannot be justified or ‘saved’ under section 1.
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Prior to determining whether a Charter violation had taken place, 
Justice Phelan had to assess whether the Charter applied in the case, given 
that John Doe was not physically present on Canadian soil at the time 
of  the application.64 Justice Phelan evaluated this question in light of  the 
Supreme Court of  Canada’s decisions in Singh v Canada65 and United States 
of  America v Burns.66 In both cases, the claimants were vulnerable to harm 
perpetrated by foreign governments on foreign soil: in Singh the claimants 
were at risk of  persecution in their home states, while in Burns the claim-
ants were at risk of  being extradited to the United States to face the death 
penalty. In both cases, the Supreme Court of  Canada ruled that Charter 
protection extended to the claimants. On this basis, Justice Phelan con-
cluded that ‘the Charter would apply to a refugee claimant at the Canadian 
border and under the control of  Canadian immigration officials’, and to 
‘every illegal immigrant in Canada claiming to be a refugee’.67 Applying 
this finding to John Doe’s situation, Justice Phelan reasoned it was ‘of  no 
import that John Doe has not actually approached the Canadian border’, 
since if  he had done so he would have automatically been sent back to the 
United States.68 Justice Phelan found it would be ‘pointless’, ‘wasteful’, and 
‘unfair’ to force John Doe to approach the Canadian border unnecessarily, 
as this would only expose him to ‘the very harm at issue before the Court’, 
and would be contrary to the spirit of  rights protection enshrined in the 
Charter.69
In finding that the Charter applied in this case – notwithstanding that 
John Doe had not yet crossed or approached the border – the decision 
effectively shifts the border, albeit indirectly. That is, it recognizes the futil-
ity of  asking John Doe to physically approach the border only to be sent 
away and, instead, imagines him as having done so already. This find-
ing is logically sound: after all, if  the decision can imagine the US border 
as travelling with the claimant into Canada, can it not also imagine the 
Canadian border as travelling with the claimant into the United States? 
The effects of  this finding are profound. By shifting the border, the deci-
sion brings John Doe with the fold of  constitutional protection. In so doing, 
it recognizes John Doe’s legal right to advance a limited but nonetheless 
actionable rights claim against the state. No less significantly, this finding 
precludes Canada from summarily dismissing John Doe’s claim. Instead, it 
triggers an enforceable, correlating duty on the part of  the state, in keeping 
with the binding precedent set out in Singh, to assess John Doe’s claim on its 
64 STCA FC decision, above n 4, at para 277.
65 Singh, above n 54.
66 United States v Burns, [2001] 1 SCR 283.
67 STCA FC decision, above n 4, at paras 281 and 280 (emphasis added).
68 ibid, at para 48.
69 ibid, at paras 47–8, citing Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493.
Efrat Arbel80
merits according to the principles of  fundamental justice.70 The decision 
can thus be read as partaking in the logic of  the shifting border principle to 
circumvent the problematic rights implications that stem from the STCA’s 
shifting of  the border. It invokes a legal fiction – imagining John Doe as 
having approached the border without requiring him to do so – to preserve 
and maintain an important legal right. The Federal Court of  Appeal, how-
ever, rejected this approach.
3.2 The Court of  Appeal judgment
The Federal Court of  Appeal overturned Justice Phelan’s decision, and 
restored the validity of  the STCA.71 The majority decision determined 
it was ‘not open to the Applications judge to hold on any of  the alleged 
grounds that the designation of  the U.S. as a safe third country and the 
related Regulations were outside the authority of  the [Governor-in-
Council] or that the STCA between Canada and the U.S. was illegal’.72 
The Court further ruled that Justice Phelan erred in finding that ‘actual’ 
compliance or compliance ‘in absolute terms’ was a condition precedent 
to the exercise of  the Governor-in-Council’s delegated authority.73 Instead, 
it found that proof  of  actual compliance was ‘irrelevant’, since this was 
‘not the issue that the Applications judge was called upon to decide’.74 
The Court determined the only relevant issue in dispute was whether the 
Governor-in-Council ‘considered the subsection 102(2) factors, and, act-
ing in good faith, designated the U.S. as a country that complies with the 
relevant Articles of  the Conventions and was respectful of  human rights’.75 
It also found that Justice Phelan erred in conducting a pragmatic and func-
tional analysis, and identified the wrong standard of  review.76
While the bulk of  the Court of  Appeal’s decision hinges on a thin and 
largely unconvincing claim about the executive discretion of  the Governor-
in-Council, its statements about the inapplicability of  the Charter are 
especially important for this analysis. The Court explicitly rejected Justice 
70 When assessed by reference to Hohfeld’s theory of  rights, this juridical relation would properly 
be classified as a ‘right-duty’ relation. See, W Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As 
Applied To Legal Reasoning’ (1913) 23 Yale LJ 28. See also, J Singer, ‘The Legal Rights Debate in 
Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld’ (1982) Wisc L Rev 975.
71 STCA FCA decision, above n 5.
72 ibid, at para 82.
73 ibid, at para 92.
74 ibid, at para 80.
75 ibid. On this point, the Court further clarified that ‘even if  “actual compliance” was a condition 
precedent, the conclusion reached by the Applications judge to the effect that the U.S. did not meet 
that requirement at the time of  promulgation could not stand since it is largely based on evidence 
which postdates the time of  the designation’, at para 81. Related to this point, the Court also held that 
the record does not support the Applications judge’s conclusion that the Governor-in-Council was in 
breach of  its obligation to conduct the ongoing review mandated by subsection 102(3) of  the IRPA, 
above n 13, at paras 83–97.
76 STCA FCA decision, ibid, at paras 59–64.
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Phelan’s finding that the Charter applied in the case, and found ‘no factual 
basis upon which to assess the alleged Charter breaches’.77 It reasoned 
instead that since John Doe ‘never presented himself  at the Canadian bor-
der and therefore never requested a determination regarding his eligibility’ 
he was not entitled to challenge the STCA under the Charter.78 According 
to the majority, the very proposition that John Doe ‘should nevertheless 
be considered as having come to the border and as having been denied 
entry’ ran directly against the established principle that Charter challenges 
‘cannot be mounted on the basis of  hypothetical situations’.79 The concur-
ring minority opinion similarly held that ‘Canadian law respecting refugee 
protection is only engaged when claimants seek protections from Canadian 
officials in Canada, including ports of  entry’,80 and that as a result, the 
Charter could not apply in this case.
The finding that John Doe must be physically present at the Canadian 
border to trigger the application of  the Charter is problematic on several 
levels. Most notably, as Brouwer explains, it prescribes that ‘before a court 
can hear a challenge to the legality of  the agreement a refugee must put 
her life at risk by coming to the border, getting refused and handed over to 
U.S. authorities for likely deportation to torture or persecution’.81 However, 
slightly more subtly, this finding rests on a disingenuous application of  two 
essentially contradictory principles. In stark contrast with Justice Phelan’s 
decision, rather than shifting the border to bring John Doe within the fold 
of  constitutional protection, the Court of  Appeal decision conceived of  
the border in static terms to bar John Doe from Charter protection. The 
decision thus precludes John Doe from claiming Charter rights because he 
did not present at the (static) border and did not request a determination 
regarding his eligibility under the STCA. Yet, at the same time, the decision 
upholds the validity of  the STCA, which shifts the border and prescribes 
that if  John Doe were to request a determination regarding his eligibil-
ity, he would be removed from Canadian jurisdiction and handed over to 
77 ibid, at paras 102 and 103.
78 ibid, at para 101.
79 ibid, at para 102.
80 ibid, at para 114, per Evans JA (emphasis added). Justice Evans further continued: ‘The provisions 
of  neither the international Conventions relied on in this litigation, nor the Charter, require Canada 
to abstain from enacting regulations which may deter nationals of  third countries in the United States 
from coming to the Canadian border’.
81 See, CCR, ‘Rights Groups Express Dismay with Appeal Court Ruling on Safe Third Country’ 
(2 July 2008), available at: <http://ccrweb.ca/eng/media/pressreleases/02july08.htm>; and CCR, 
‘Stay of  Third Country Decision Puts Refugees’ Lives at Risk’ (1 Feb 2008), available at: <http://
ccrweb.ca/eng/media/pressreleases/1feb08.htm> last accessed 15 Sept 2012. Notably, the Court did 
address this point, at para 101, by suggesting that when a claimant enters Canada, his return is not 
automatic, given that he is first subject to a preliminary assessment process. The Court suggested that 
during this process, he could seek counsel and mount a Charter challenge. This suggestion is practi-
cally unworkable, and fails to account for the many procedural and substantive obstacles that would 
prevent a claimant from doing so, not to mention the risks such action would pose to his life and safety.
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US authorities. The decision thus puts John Doe in an impossible bind: 
the static border principle requires him to present at the border to trigger 
the Charter’s application, but the shifting border principle precludes him 
from doing do. Put another way, the decision places John Doe in a legal 
catch-22: barred from entry because of  the shifting border principle, and 
denied rights because of  the static border principle. Stripped of  recourse 
to effective legal action under Canadian law, and suspended between two 
conflicting directives, his predicament is that of  liminality: he is still subject 
to the law, but left bereft by it.82
This finding carries serious coercive implications for John Doe, and 
for refugee claimants in his position. The Federal Court decision recog-
nizes John Doe’s legal right to challenge the STCA under the Charter. 
In contrast, the Federal Court of  Appeal decision denies John Doe the 
ability to challenge the STCA before a Canadian court, and leaves him 
vulnerable to deportation and refoulement.83 No less significantly, whereas 
the Federal Court decision imposes upon Canada a legal duty, consistent 
with Singh, to provide John Doe with basic constitutional protections, the 
Federal Court of  Appeal confers upon Canada the privilege to summarily 
disregard, deny, or dismiss his claim.84 This shift marks a notable change in 
Canada’s approach to refugee protection: it privileges the exercise of  state 
power, and authorizes Canada to dodge John Doe’s claim without legal 
consequence.
Viewed in this light, the Federal Court of  Appeal STCA  decision 
does much more than clarify the executive discretion of  the Governor-
in-Council, or the appropriate standard of  review. It in fact re-
defines the Canadian refugee regime as fundamentally exclusionary 
towards STCA claimants, and calls into question the central prin-
ciples by which the Canadian refugee determination regime is dis-
tinguished and defined. In Singh v Canada, the Supreme Court of  
Canada held that all refugee claimants physically present on state soil – 
including those present at the border – are entitled to have their claims 
heard on their merits and in keeping with the principles of  fundamental 
justice.85 This is one of  the established hallmarks of  Canadian refugee law. 
The Court further stated that refugees who do not have safe haven else-
where are ‘entitled to rely on this country’s willingness to live up to the obli-
gations it has undertaken as a signatory to the United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of  Refugees’.86 In Canada v Ward, the Court emphasized 
82 This state is in many ways reminiscent of  the ‘state of  exception’, as discussed by Agamben in, eg, 
G Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford University Press, 1995).
83 In distinction from the relationship discussed above, when assessed by reference to Hohfeld’s 
theory of  rights, this relation would be classified as the ‘no-right/privilege’ jural relation, above n 54.
84 Hohfeld, above n 70.
85 Singh, above n 54, at 190.
86 ibid, at 194.
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Canada’s commitment to establishing a ‘forum of  second resort for the 
persecuted’, and underscored the importance of  not ‘render[ing] illusory 
Canada’s provision of  a haven for refugees’, by applying adequate stan-
dards of  refugee protection.87 This commitment is also clearly stated in the 
IRPA, which lists among its objectives the goal of  ‘grant[ing], as a funda-
mental expression of  Canada’s humanitarian ideals, fair consideration to 
those who come to Canada claiming persecution’, and ‘establish[ing] fair 
and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of  the Canadian 
refugee protection system, while upholding Canada’s respect for the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of  all human beings’.88 The 
Federal Court decision casts serious doubt on these laudable goals.
4. Conclusion
The Federal Court and Federal Court of  Appeal’s STCA decisions are 
two of  several decisions issued in recent years to address the extraterrito-
rial application of  the Canadian Charter. In R v Hape, for example, the 
Supreme Court of  Canada assessed whether officers of  the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police were acting in compliance with the Charter in searching 
the house of  the accused, a Canadian citizen, on Turks and Caicos terri-
tory. The Court held that the law of  the state in which the activities occur 
must govern, and that the Charter does not generally apply to searches 
and seizures in other countries. As the Court explained, ‘international 
customary law and the principle of  comity of  nations generally prevent 
the Charter from applying to the actions of  Canadian officials operating 
outside of  Canada’.89 This principle is subject only to the Charter’s fair 
trial safeguards and to the limits on comity that prevent Canadian officers 
from participating in activities that violate Canada’s international human 
rights obligations.90 The Court did not provide clear instruction as to when 
the principle of  comity might give way to the human rights exception, but 
left open ‘the possibility that, in a future case, participation by Canadian 
officers in activities in another country that would violate Canada’s inter-
national human rights obligations might justify a remedy under s.24(1) of  
the Charter’.91
The Court came close to clarifying when this exception might apply in 
Canada (Justice) v Khadr92 and Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr,93 two cases that 
also involved the extraterritorial application of  the Charter. In these cases, 
87 Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689, at 726–7 and 718.
88 IRPA, above n 13, at section 2 (c) and (e).
89 Above n 54, para 14.
90 R v Hape, [2007] 2 SCR 292, 2007 SCC 26, at paras 88–90.
91 Above n 54, para 101.
92 Canada (Justice) v Khadr, [2008] 2 SCR 143, 2008 SCC 29.
93 Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, [2010] 1 SCR 44, 2010 SCC 3.
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the Court ruled on the legality of  Canadian citizen Omar Khadr’s impris-
onment in Guantanamo Bay. In keeping with its statements in Hape, the 
Court explained that while Canadian officials operating outside Canada 
are not generally subject to the Charter, the jurisprudence ‘leaves the door 
open to an exception in the case of  Canadian participation in activities 
of  a foreign state or its agents that are contrary to Canada’s international 
obligations or fundamental human rights norms’.94 Given findings that the 
military commission regime in place at Guantanamo Bay engaged in vio-
lations of  fundamental human rights protected by international law, the 
Court found that the human rights exception contemplated in Hape could 
apply.95 On the facts, the Court concluded that the ‘Charter applied to the 
actions of  Canadian officials operating at Guantanamo Bay’.96
The Federal Court of  Appeal’s decision in Amnesty International Canada 
v Canada (Chief  of  the Defense Staff),97 however, suggests the Charter would 
not apply extraterritorially in cases involving refugee claimants, even if  
fundamental human rights were at stake. The case concerned the transfer 
of  Afghani detainees held by Canadian Forces abroad to Afghani authori-
ties. The applicants sought various forms of  declaratory relief, including a 
declaration that the Charter obliges Canadian forces to halt the transfer in 
situations that might expose the detainees to a substantial risk of  torture, 
as this would be contrary to Canada’s international human rights com-
mitments. The Court held that while Canadian Forces can clearly exer-
cise power beyond state borders, the Charter does not restrict them while 
operating abroad. It further clarified that the extraterritorial application 
of  the Charter contemplated in Khadr could not apply to ‘foreigners, with 
no attachment whatsoever to Canada or its laws’.98 These cases suggest 
that while Canadian courts are willing to shift the border outside state soil, 
the Charter only follows where fundamental human rights are at stake 
and where these rights implicate individuals who have some attachment 
to Canada. In all likelihood, refugee claimants like John Doe would not 
be able to prove sufficient attachment in order to satisfy this requirement. 
Viewed together, these cases thus suggest that while the Canadian border 
can shift to extend state power abroad, it remains static to limit access to 
refugee rights and remedies.
Notably, the Supreme Court of  Canada denied leave to appeal in both 
the Afghani transfer case and the STCA appeal. Both cases would have 
offered the Court the opportunity to establish clear criteria to guide law-
makers and government officials on the troubling question of  how far 
94 ibid, at para 14.
95 Khadr (2008), above n 92, at para 24; Khadr (2010), ibid, at para 16.
96 Canada v Khadr (2010), above n 93, at para 16.
97 Amnesty International Canada v Canada (Chief  of  the Defense Staff), 2008 FCA 401.
98 Amnesty International Canada v Canada, ibid, at para 14.
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state power extends across borders. So long as these decisions stand as 
binding law, the problems and difficulties emerging from the simultane-
ous application of  both the static and shifting border principles will no 
doubt persist, creating a legal landscape marked by immense uncertainty. 
This article demonstrates that the logical principles and rhetorical turns 
applied by legal actors in navigating this landscape are not without import. 
As Canada increasingly turns to strategies that shift borders and alter 
geographies, it becomes imperative to recognize that legal measures that 
shift the borders not only shift Canada’s boundary line, but also alter the 
juridical relationship produced by that boundary, as well as the rights and 
duties it prescribes. If  Canadian refugee law continues to determine refu-
gee rights based on a claimant’s status vis à vis state borders, it is necessary 
that it clarify precisely where these borders lie and recognize their chang-
ing locations. Canadian refugee law must further avoid the simultaneous 
application of  shifting and static border principles where this application 
threatens to undo the very foundations of  Canada’s refugee protection 
regime. To do otherwise would not only risk undermining Canada’s com-
mitment to refugee protection, but would also risk closing Canada’s bor-
ders to refugees.
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